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WHYDONATIONALCOURT JUDGES REFER
TOHUMANRIGHTS TREATIES?
A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAWANALYSISOFCEDAW
By Christopher McCrudden*
I. INTRODUCTION
Comparative international law promises to bring fresh attention to the similarities and dif-
ferences in how international law is understood and approached at the domestic level.1 Com-
parative international human rights law applies this focus to similarities and differences in the
ways that international human rights law is, for example, interpreted at the domestic level by
courts.2
As a contribution to this emerging field, I conducted a limited study of the domestic judicial
interpretation of one core international human rights convention, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms ofDiscriminationAgainstWomen (CEDAW).3 In an attempt to test
the utility of a comparative international law approach, an analysis was conducted of 325
national judicial decisions across fifty-five jurisdictions, in which CEDAW was referred to in
the report of the case, including the arguments made to, or the reasoning of, the court (sub-
sequently referred to as “the dataset”).
A more detailed description of this study, the methodology I adopted in conducting the
study, a justification of that methodology including its focus on the domestic judicial use of
CEDAW, the important limitations of the methodology I adopted, and the detailed findings
of the study will all be published as a chapter in a separate Colloquium volume, Comparative
* Fellow of the British Academy; Professor of Equality andHumanRights Law,Queen’sUniversity Belfast;Wil-
liamW.CookGlobal Professor of Law,University ofMichigan Law School; Fellow,Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin
(2014–15).The author thanksVeronikaFikak,BenedictKingsbury,ChristophMöllers,Daniel Peat, SteveRatner,
Anthea Roberts, Mila Versteeg, participants at the Sokol Colloquium on Comparative International Law at the
University of Virginia, participants at a seminar atHumboldtUniversity, and several anonymous referees, for help-
ful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Several colleagues also assisted in attempting to locate relevant case
law in Japan, the People’s Republic of China, andRussia. I am exceptionally grateful toGleb Bogush, Akiko Ejima,
Nico Howson, Benedict Kingsbury, Mark West, and Alex X. Zang.
1 Anthea Roberts et al., Conceptualizing Comparative International Law, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Anthea Roberts et al. eds., forthcoming).
2 See Christopher McCrudden, Comparative International Law and Human Rights, in COMPARATIVE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18,
1979, 1249UNTS13, 19 ILM33. See, in particular,WOMEN’SHUMANRIGHTS: CEDAW IN INTERNATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW (Anne Hellum &Henriette Sinding Aasen eds., 2013) [hereinafter WOMEN’S
HUMAN RIGHTS]; THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN: A COMMENTARY (Marsha A. Freeman et al. eds., 2012); THE WOMEN’S CONVENTION
TURNED 30: ACHIEVEMENTS, SETBACKS, AND PROSPECTS (Ingrid Westendorp ed., 2012).
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International Law.4 This chapter should be of interest to future scholars attempting to conduct
any similar inquiry, particularly those interested in considering how to test hypotheses andpre-
dictions emerging from the field of comparative international human rights law.
Although I do not seek to go into detail here on these findings, a brief sketch of them is nec-
essary for understanding the analysis conducted in the current article.There are four important
empirical findings from this study. First, references to CEDAW are seldommore than cursory
and are usually to be found combined with lists of other international instruments. CEDAW
is infrequently singled out for special mention and even less frequently subject to substantive
interpretation.
Second, although there are significant differences between jurisdictions in nonsubstantive
areas (for instance, in how CEDAW is received into the national legal and judicial systems, in
the techniques of interpretation applied, and in the legal status of CEDAW at the national
level), these differences appear to have relatively little effect on the substantive interpretation
of CEDAW.
Third, although there are prominent examples of cases in which national courts adopt sub-
stantively different interpretations of CEDAW, the evidence from the dataset shows a remark-
able absence of divergence across jurisdictions as to the substantive meaning of CEDAW. This
is the case not only with regard to the results that the courts arrive at, but also in the conception
of rights incorporated in CEDAW (to whom are obligations owed, by whom, and with what
limitations?). This finding is significant but the implications of this finding should not be exag-
gerated; it arises partly because they are relatively few instances in which the same issue arises
in different jurisdictions. The lack of disagreement may signal that the comparative case law
available on any particular substantive issue is relatively thin.
Fourth, courts did not tend to refer to the interpretations of CEDAW by other foreign
domestic courts, and little transnational judicial dialogue takes place in the interpretation of
CEDAWby national judges, even where engagement with foreign judicial sources is otherwise
commonplace in the interpretation of national constitutional and statutory law, and even in
cases where there are directly relevant foreign judgments.
The most difficult questions, assuming these findings are correct, are how and why these
similarities and differences come about. In the present article, I present a preliminary analysis
of these findings, tackling the difficult question of how to explain this pattern of use, and I ten-
tatively suggest explanations.My provisional conclusion is that observable similarities and dif-
ferences result, at least in part, from the functions that international human rights law fulfills
in domestic jurisdictions, and that these functions may differ from the role that international
human rights law plays at the international level.
II. ANALYSIS AND A PROVISIONAL EXPLANATION
This study challenges several current explanations of the domestic use of international law
bydomestic courts: that the interpretation of international law is likely to show significant vari-
ationdomestically;5 that domestic courts act as agents of the international legal order;6 and that
4 COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
5 See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9, 17 (1999);
Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 501, 503, 506
2015] 535WHY DO NATIONAL COURT JUDGES REFER TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES?
This content downloaded from 163.1.255.60 on Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:09:37 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
domestic courts seek to shape international legal approaches through their domestic interpre-
tations, in order to serve national interests.7 None of these suggestions drawn from recent
scholarship is unequivocally supported by my study of the judicial use of CEDAW in national
level cases. Indeed, the pattern of use is substantially different fromwhatmight have been pre-
dicted in each case.Weneed, therefore, to present additional or alternative explanations for the
pattern of domestic use of international human rights law that replace, supplement, or com-
plement these explanations.
Domestic Courts and International Law
The evidence I present in Comparative International Law indicates that domestic judges are
primarily domestic actorswhouseCEDAWinorder to advancedomestic goals.Thus, although
in legal theory international law may provide the “overarching normative framework” within
which national courts operate,8 that is often not how it seems, reading the judgments. In terms
of Eyal Benvenisti’s typology,9 drawing from the evidence of the use of CEDAW, domestic
courts see themselves as domestic players using international law strategically, but there is little
evidence that they see themselves as agents or trustees of international law. They do not pri-
marily see themselves, therefore, as seeking to achieve the goal of advancing international law
as such (what Anthea Roberts has termed national courts as “impartial law enforcers” of inter-
national law10 ).Nor do they appear to see themselves as agents of a domestic community seek-
ing to shape international legal approaches to suit the preferences of their own state (whatRob-
erts has termed national courts as “partial law creators” of international law11). The strategic
goals they seek to further are mostly institutional rather than national, supporting the recent
findings by Aust, Rodiles, and Staubach.12 The key word is mostly. There are examples where
the relevant court does appear more in the guise of an “agent” of international law.13
In general, however,my analysis cohereswith that of Paul Stephan. Echoing Stephan’smore
general analysis, the evidence regarding CEDAW indicates that the national courts “have inter-
ests of their own, shaped by the incentivesmotivating thosewhowork in those institutions and
(2000); see generally Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and
Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57 (2011).
6 See, e.g., ANDRE´ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 8 (2011).
7 See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes
of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 159, 161 (1993).
8 NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 6, at 1.
9 Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts,
102 AJIL 241 (2008).
10 Roberts, supra note 5, at 68.
11 Id.
12 Helmut Philipp Aust, Alejandro Rodiles & Peter Staubach, Unity or Uniformity? Domestic Courts and Treaty
Interpretation, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 75 (2014).
13 Pant v. Nepal Government, Writ No. 917 of 2064, 138 I.L.R. 500 (S. Ct. Nepal 2007). The Court said:
“We . . . should internalize the international practices in regard to the enjoyment of the right of an individual . . . .”
Id. at 528. The Court continued: “Otherwise, our commitment to the human rights will be questioned interna-
tionally, if we ignore the rights of such people only on the ground that it might be a social stigma.” Id. Even here,
however, the Court was intent on creating a degree of distance between itself and the international community. It
stressed the need to “chang[e] world society and practices of respecting the rights of minorit[ies] gradually.” Id.
(emphasis added).
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the institution’s design.”14 My evidence also supports a modest generalization of Neha Jain’s
conclusion regarding the IndianSupremeCourt’s citationof international law.Discussing that
particular court, she suggests that “the SupremeCourt has used international law in the pursuit
of primarily domestic goals.”15 Her description appears to describe accurately the approach
taken by domestic courts more generally in the context of citation of CEDAW. Viewing the
evidence presented previously through this lens seems to provide a more satisfying approach
to explaining several critical findings.
Substantive Interpretative Divergence
Recent international law scholarship has suggested, contrary to the longstanding assump-
tions onwhich international law often proceeded in the past,16 that the interpretation of inter-
national law at the domestic level is likely to show significant divergence from country to coun-
try and from region to region.17 This argument mirrors similar arguments concerning the
interpretation of international law at the international level, where significant differences in
substantive interpretations of the same text have been observed. The latter phenomenon has
been termed “fragmentation.”18
According toSallyMerry, thedomestic receptionof international legal norms (what she calls
“vernacularization”) “falls along a continuum depending on how extensively local cultural
forms and practices are incorporated into imported institutions.”19 Using her analytical con-
tinuum of “vernacularization,” she compares jurisdictions based on such factors as whether
international human rights law has been “rejected”; whether it has been “ignored”; whether it
has been “subverted” (by which Merry means “seized and transformed into something quite
different from the transnational concept, out of the reach of the global legal system but nev-
ertheless calledby the samename”); 20whether aprocess of “replication” is tobe found inwhich
“the imported institution remains largelyunchanged from its transnational prototype” andany
adaptation is “superficial and primarily decorative”; or whether “hybridization” can be iden-
tified,meaning that there is “aprocess thatmerges imported institutions and symbolswith local
ones, sometimes uneasily.”21
14 Paul B. Stephan,The Structure of Courts and International Lawmaking—Explaining Judicial Conflict, inCOM-
PARATIVE INTERNATIONALLAW, supranote 1.Where I part companywith Stephan, however, is that I do not seek
to suggest that the way the courts behave is due to the structuring of the courts’ mechanisms by political actors. I
leave open, therefore, the extent to which the courts in this context act as agents of national political actors, but my
intuition is that this is, in the main, not what is happening in the cases I have considered.
15 Neha Jain, The Democratizing Force of International Law: Human Rights Adjudication by the Indian Supreme
Court, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
16 Hersch Lauterpacht,Decisions of Municipal Courts as a Source of International Law, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 65,
93 (1929) (identifying national courts as “the trustedmouthpieces of international law”); id. at 95 (“[I]nternational
law is the only branch of law containing identical rules professedly administered as such by the courts of all
nations.”).
17 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 5, at 17; Knop, supra note 5, at 503, 506; see generally, Roberts, supra note 5.
18 See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi & Pa¨ivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553 (2002).
19 Sally EngleMerry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. ANTHRO-
POLOGIST 38, 44 (2006).
20 Id. at 40.
21 Id. at 44.
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Susanne Zwingel has suggested that domestic reception of international norms is likely to
result in significant differences from place to place, and that previous assumptions that such
norms would lead to greater homogenization are exaggerated.22 As Zwingel puts it, “universal
principles,when applied toparticular contexts, inevitably take ondifferent forms.”23Therehas
long been a critique of how international law has been seen by scholars to operate in practice
at thedomestic level.The criticism is that theprocess has been seen as too top-down,with inter-
national law being received at the domestic level somewhat passively and with domestic actors
rarely exercising independent agency in (re)constructing international law in the process of its
domestic reception.24 Some seek to develop a more neutral language of engagement between
the domestic and the international, one in which a more syncretic approach is taken, when a
different norm emerges out of the contact between the exported norm and the indigenous
norm. Based on this, wemight have predicted, therefore, that an equivalent type of “fragmen-
tation” is occurring at the national level as is said to have taken place at the international level,
and that we could expect a significant degree of divergence in the substantive interpretation of
the Convention at the national level.25
This does not seem to be the case in the context of CEDAW. There are clear examples of
where appeals to CEDAWnorms have beenmarginalized and ignored,26 but (importantly) few
clear examples of outright rejection, or of subversion, or (more surprisingly, perhaps) of hybrid-
ization in the substantive interpretation of the CEDAWnorms at the judicial level. (Of course,
what constitutes “subversion” and “hybridization” is somewhat in the eye of the beholder.27)
These seem to be entirely missing, at least in so far as the domestic judicial interpretation of
22 SusanneZwingel,How Do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women’s Rights in Transnational Perspective,
56 INT’L STUD. Q. 115, 121 (2012).
23 Id. at 126.
24 Id. at 118.
25 This is similar to the hypothesis articulated by Stephan, supra note 14 (“National courts will demonstrate a
significant variation in claims about international law.”). See also Aust, Rodiles & Staubach, supra note 12.
26 E.g., Malkani v. Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Writ Petition No. 3192 of 1992 (S. Ct. Bangl.
1997) (described in ASIA PACIFIC FORUM ON WOMEN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, A DIGEST OF CASE LAW
ON THEHUMANRIGHTS OF WOMEN (Asia Pacific) 9–11 (2003)); Peter v. Ministry of Home Affairs, No. 1379
of 2048, 11 N.K.P. 2048 at 749 (Nepal 1992) (described in FORUM FOR WOMEN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT,
IMPACT OF EXISTING DISCRIMINATORY CITIZENSHIP LAW ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN NEPAL 61–62
(2006)).
27 For example, the Constitutional Court of Turkey was asked to consider a legislative provision that required
women to adopt the name of their husbands on marriage: see Esas No. 2009/85, Karar No. 2011/49 (CUMA,
ResmîGazete, Sayı: 28091) [OfficialNewspaper,No. 28091] (Turk. 2011). CEDAWwas interpreted as permitting
the legislature to use its margin of appreciation on the basis of local historical and political reasons. For the Turkish
litigant seeking not to use her husband’s last name the court subverted CEDAW. Another example that comes close
to subversion relates to Japan. Dana Zartner has argued that “Japanese courts assume that the meaning, scope, and
effect of human rights provisions under international human rights law are the same as those under the Japanese
Constitution.” DANA ZARTNER, COURTS, CODES, AND CUSTOM: LEGAL TRADITION AND STATE POLICY
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 243 (2014) (citing YUJI IWASAWA,
INTERNATIONALLAW,HUMANRIGHTSLAWANDJAPANESELAW:THEIMPACTOF INTERNATIONALLAWON
JAPANESE LAW 243 (1998)). In X1 and X2 v. Government of Japan, a Japanese court, in deciding that a provision
of the Civil Code which prohibited women from remarrying for 180 days after divorce, did not violate CEDAW,
assumed that CEDAW’s provisions were no stricter than the Japanese Constitution. Hiroshima Kōtō Saibansho
[Hiroshima High Ct.] Nov. 28, 1991, 1406 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 3 ( Japan).
538 [Vol. 109:534THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This content downloaded from 163.1.255.60 on Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:09:37 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CEDAW is concerned. Anne Bayefsky’s conclusion regarding the use of CEDAW in the Cana-
dian courts seems to be generalizable: “Where courts are inclined to come to conclusions
incompatible with the Convention, they will simply ignore it.”28
Itmay be that courts cite CEDAWmostlywhen theywant to draw support from it, butwhen
they want to disagree with a particular reading of CEDAW, they just marginalize and ignore
it, rather than reinterpret, subvert, or hybridize. The Lesotho High Court, for example, in
upholding customary law rights relating to male succession to chieftainship, relied on the fact
that, in acceding to CEDAW, the government had entered reservations, as it was permitted to
do under CEDAW, which specifically excluded matters concerning customary practices relat-
ing to succession to the throne and to chieftainship. The Court referred to CEDAW and the
Government’s reservation as a reason why it should not interfere with the Executive and the
Legislature in this matter.29 The international remains important, but in these cases to defend
the status quo rather than change it.
An Artefact of the Methodology?
It is arguable, however, that the finding of relative homogeneity of domestic interpretation
is an artefact of the limits on my original model for selection of cases. Only looking at cases
where CEDAWhas been cited, rather than where it could have been cited but was not, is likely
to lead to a skewed picture as to the extent to which national courts disagree with CEDAW or
with particular interpretations of CEDAW by others. The methodology of looking at cases
where CEDAW is cited, rather than not cited, might result in a blind spot as to the degree to
which there is disagreement and divergence among national judges.30
There is another possible explanation for the absence of apparent divergence, which again
has to do with the methodology I adopted. There was significant substantive divergence on
three issues: the implications of the requirement in CEDAW that “special measures” should be
“temporary,” the application of CEDAW to customary inheritance laws, and the appropriate
metaprinciplewhich should influence the interpretation of theCEDAWprovisions.31 The first
two of these issues have generated a relatively “thick” comparative jurisprudence, giving some
weight to an argument that significant differences in substantive interpretationmay be appar-
ent only when there is jurisprudence available in which the same or similar issues arise in a suf-
ficient number of different jurisdictions. It can be argued that the relative paucity of such juris-
prudence camouflages the extent of divergence. On the other hand, the relative absence of
diverging interpretation in the context of applications of CEDAW to rape and divorce among
others—in which a relatively thick comparative jurisprudence does exist but there is still min-
imal divergence—urges caution in rushing too swiftly to a conclusion that my results are sim-
ply an artefact of the absence of a sufficiently dense comparative jurisprudence.
28 Anne F. Bayefsky, General Approaches to Domestic Application of Women’s International Human Rights Law,
in HUMANRIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 351, 365 (Rebecca J. Cook
ed., 1994). For an equivalent conclusion regarding Chinese courts, see Congyan Cai, International Law, Domestic
Courts, and the Rise of China, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
29 Masupha v. Senior ResidentMagistrate for the Subordinate Court of Berea, L.S.H.C. 9 [58] (Lesotho 2013).
30 If they do that, they might just ignore CEDAW, and this is perhaps borne out by the absence of any citations
to CEDAW in the Chinese courts.
31 McCrudden, supra note 2.
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CEDAW as an International Norm
My analysis does not suggest that CEDAW is treated as simply equivalent to national norms
(domestic or foreign) or that the international legal status of CEDAW is simply ignored. Anne-
Marie Slaughter has long shown that an important set of explanations for how international
law has been incorporated domestically has to do with such issues as the identity of the judges,
the institutional framework and location within which they operate, their connectedness to
global networks, and the constraints of the ideas and practice available to them in their dis-
cursive community.32 Importantly, for our purposes,Merry distinguishes domestic translators
of international legal norms into the domestic context who “may have greater interest in the
source . . . of the transaction” from those who have “greater interest in . . . the target of the
transaction.”33 She continues: “[t]ranslators committed to the target produce more hybrid
transplants whereas those closer to the source create replicas.”34 The fact that we find few
hybrid transplants in the CEDAW dataset suggests, based on Merry’s suggestion, that there is
indeed “greater interest” in the source than the target, and the source is, of course, interna-
tional.
My evidence suggests that CEDAW’s status as an “organ of the international community”
is a critical reason why it is useful in addressing “primarily domestic goals.”35 There appears to
be a strong desire for domestic courts to emphasize that CEDAW contains norms that are (1)
international (not just transnational or comparative) as well as (2) relatively static in their
meaning (rather than subject to shifting meanings with a significant role for domestic inter-
pretation in shaping that meaning).
This appears tobebecause of an important function thatCEDAWplays at thedomestic level.
Promoting an external, static, and top-down understanding of international lawmeans that it
canbedrawnon inways and for purposes that a flexible andbottom-upunderstanding of inter-
national law, one in which the domestic court accepts that it has considerable latitude in the
meaning of the international legal provision, would be less likely to support. In other words,
CEDAW appears to be useful to domestic courts in particular where the court can present it as
clear, external, and authoritative.AsMerry has observedmore generally,CEDAW’s “regulatory
strength depends on the cultural legitimacy of the international process of consensus building
and related social movements to define social justice in these terms.”36 CEDAW is a “form of
global legality that depends deeply on its texts . . . for the production of culturalmeanings asso-
ciated withmodernity and the international.”37 The domestic court has an active role in trans-
lating the norm, but it prefers to present this norm as top-down and its own role as somewhat
passive.
32 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004) [hereinafter SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLDORDER]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191 (2003) [here-
inafter Slaughter, Global Community]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103
(2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Judicial Globalization]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Commu-
nication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) [hereinafter Slaughter, Typology].
33 Merry, supra note 19, at 40.
34 Id. at 48.
35 Neha Jain appears to deny this. Jain, supra note 15. Although, in general, my analysis is similar to Jain’s, I dis-
agree that this aspect of her analysis can be generalized beyond India.
36 Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law—Violence against Women and the Human Rights System, 28 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 941, 941 (2003).
37 Id. at 973.
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As a result, there is little evidence of the adoption of discourse-based approaches to the inter-
pretation of CEDAW, in which relatively open-ended international human rights standards
provide the opportunity for contested views to be openly debated and argued about, andwhere
human rights norms are seen as continually reinvented and resolutions are at best temporary
and provisional. That approach would simply not fulfill the function that domestic courts
appear to need CEDAW to play.
In the judicial context, the international normmay not cause the judge to act in a particular
way, but it gives the judge a way of grounding what they want to do in something beyond the
judge’s subjective views; to do this successfully, the judge has an incentive to make the inter-
national norm seem lessmalleable. Some further support for this suggestionmay be drawn (by
analogy) from Katerina Linos’s recent study of the way that politicians like to reference how
their ideas reflect international norms or practices adopted elsewhere and are therefore main-
stream rather than idiosyncratic.38
There are several examples from the dataset.39 In supporting affirmative action provisions
benefittingwomen in elections, the IndonesianConstitutionalCourt draws onCEDAW’s sup-
port for affirmative action as representing developing international opinion, and regards this
as a positive reasonwhy domestic law should be interpreted to permit it also.40 In deciding that
the marriage of a minor under the age of sixteen could not be the basis of a residence permit
in light of the best interests of the child and other human rights considerations (including
CEDAW), the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court rejected the more culturally relativistic
approach of the lower court, in favor of an approach that was more universalistic, because this
was the international standard.41 In deciding whether Kenyan courts could rely on interna-
tional law to resolve succession disputes, the Kenyan Court of Appeal emphasized the inter-
national dimension in interpreting a provision of domestic law. In adopting this provision,
“[t]he country was moving in tandem with emerging global culture, particularly on gender
issues.”42 When American courts want to move against female genital cutting, it appears
important to demonstrate (using CEDAW) that this move has international support.43 When
the Indian Supreme Court engages in an intensive campaign against gender discrimination, it
appeared to be important to it to stress that “the cry for equality and equal status . . . is not
restrictive to any particular country but world over with variation in degree only.”44When the
Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court engages with the right to marry, it appears to be
38 Katerina Linos, How to Select and Develop International Law Case Studies: Lessons from Comparative Law and
Comparative Politics, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
39 See also Ferneley v Boxing Auth. of New South Wales (2001) 115 FCR 306 (Austl.); Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho
[Tokyo High Ct.] Dec. 22, 2000, 796 Rōdō Hanrei 5 ( Japan) (Shiba Shinyo Kinko case).
40 Putusan No. 22-24 PUU-VI/2008 (Const. Ct. Rep. Indon.).
41 A v. Directorate of Finnish Immigration, 5.12.2005/3219, KHO:2005:87, ILDC 594 (Sup. Admin. Ct.
2005) (Fin.). “When considering the provisions of international treaties . . . cultural background was not a justi-
fication for taking a child to a third country, to which she had no ties, and marrying her off to a person whom she
had not seen since her early childhood.” Id.
42 Rono v. Rono & Another, (2005) 1 K.L.R. 803, 813 (Kenya).
43 Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5thCir. 1988); Abankwah v. I.N.S., 185 F.3d 18 (2dCir. 1999); Bah v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008).
44 Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 228 (India).
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important to stress that the right to marry is protected both by Islamic Shari’a and by inter-
national instruments, including CEDAW.45
Domestic Legal Status of CEDAW
In seeking explanations for the relative absence of divergence, an alternative explanation is
plausible, however. It may be that where reliance on CEDAW is not compulsory, it is easier to
ignore CEDAW and not cite it than it is to cite it and then interpret it into a hybrid transplant.
Domestic courts may be more likely to contest an interpretation of CEDAW by others when
they have to engagewith an international law norm. Some of the prominent cases that Stephan
cites, for example, where a domestic court deliberately resists the position taken by an inter-
national court, seem to fall into this category.46 If courts do not have to engage with interna-
tional legal norms, and their interest is really only in domestic application rather than inter-
national influence, they are likely to have less incentive to invoke CEDAW only to qualify it,
disagree with it, or try to shift its interpretation.
This possibility bring us to the critical question of the possible effect of the national legal
status of CEDAW, and the effect of that legal status on the pattern of use and non-use I have
described. In this context, the legal status accorded toCEDAWcanbe regarded as an indication
of how far the court considers that it “must” engagewithCEDAW.To the extent that domestic
courts adopt different substantive interpretations, or are less willing to cite CEDAW at all, it
might be supposed that these differences reflect the different legal status accorded by states to
human rights conventions.47 We might have predicted that states that regard ratified conven-
tions as having direct legal effect will engage more intensively with CEDAW than states that
require ratified conventions to go through some further domestic legal process (usually a leg-
islative procedure of enactment) before a convention can be given domestic legal effect.48
There is, indeed, some evidence of this occurring.Courts do treat the question of the domes-
tic legal status of CEDAW and whether it is legally binding as important.49 The (absence of)
domestic legal status being accorded to CEDAW ismore likely to be used, in the latter context,
45 Case No. 23 of the 16th Judicial Year/1995/Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt).
46 Compare HCJ 7957/04, Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477 [2005] (Isr.), with Legal Con-
sequences of the Construction of aWall in theOccupied Palestinian Territory, AdvisoryOpinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136
( July 9); compare Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), and Medellı´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008),
with Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
47 See, e.g., Mila Versteeg, Law Versus Norms: The Impact of Human Rights Treaties on Constitutional Rights (Va.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 2014-02), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id2360814 (describing the impact of human rights treaties as dependent onwhether a state has amonist
or dualist system).
48 ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2013).
49 Courts refer to CEDAW as binding law (“duty”) in the following cases: Halaguen˜a v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 172013, 602 S.C.R.A. 297 (Phil. 2009); Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
119976, 248 S.C.R.A. 300 (Phil. 1995); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 98Hun-Ma363,Dec. 23, 1999, (11-2
KCCR 770) (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Da1178, July 21, 2005 (S. Kor.); Awop v. Lapenmal, VUIC
2 (Malekula I. Ct. 2007) (Vanuatu); Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage, NJF 2010, 113m.nt Drewes en vanHellemondt
(Wichmann/Ministerie vanVolksgezondheid,Welzijn en Sport) (Neth. 2010);HR, JB 2010, 115m.nt Schutgens
en Sillen (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties/Wichmann) (Neth. 2010); L v. C, [2007] 3
H.K.L.R.D. 819 (H.K. Ct. App.); Amparo en Revisio´n 300/2012, Tercer Tribunal Colegiado enMateria Civil del
Primer Circuito [TCC] [Third Collegiate Civil Court of the First Circuit], Semanario Judicial de la Federacio´n y
su Gaceta, De´cima E´poca, tomo III, Marzo de 2013, Pa´gina 1908 (Mex.); Amparo Directo 799/2008, Tercer Tri-
bunal Colegiado en Materia de Trabajo del Cuarto Circuito [TCC] [Third Collegiate Court on Labor for the
542 [Vol. 109:534THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This content downloaded from 163.1.255.60 on Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:09:37 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
as a basis fornot accordingCEDAWgreater normativeweight.50Butmyfindings challengehow
far it is generally the case that courts are more likely to advance alternative interpretations of
CEDAW where it is considered as legally binding, which indicate that no clear difference in
citation and engagement appears to track legal status. Something more complex appears to be
occurring.
CEDAW as Law
There is an important distinction in practice between CEDAW being the ground for direct
legal claims in domestic courts and CEDAW being accorded indirect weight in the interpre-
tative context. In the latter context, when it is accorded indirect effect, the court will be more
likely to be convinced of the appropriateness of the content of the norm that CEDAW incor-
porates,51 or from the degree of international consensus for the need for change in particular
areas thatCEDAWrepresents,52 thanbyCEDAW’s legal status, given thatCEDAWisnot legally
binding in that context.This canbe seenmost clearly, perhaps, in those cases inwhich the court
Fourth Circuit], Semanario Judicial de la Federacio´n y su Gaceta, Novena E´poca, tomo XXIX, Febrero de 2009,
Pa´gina 2035 (Mex.).
50 Police v. Apelu, W.S.S.C. 178 (Samoa 2010) (court rejected counsel’s use of CEDAW to limit the harshness
of the criminal law);Magaya v.Magaya, 3 LRC 35 (Sup. Ct. Zim. 1999) (Constitution protects the discriminatory
aspects of customary law, CEDAW notwithstanding).
51 CEDAW is apparently being used for normative purposes rather than for its legal authority in the following
cases: Rajapaksha v. Attorney General, SBHC 189 (Solom. Is. 2011); Balelala v. State, (2004) FJCA 49 (Ct. App.
Fiji I.) (CEDAW “adds weight”); Na´lez U´stavnı´ho soudu ze dne 28.02.2012 (U´S) [Decision of the Constitutional
Court of February 28, 2012], sp.zn. Pl.U´S 26/11 (Czech) (development of recommendations to the Government,
even in the absence of violation of CEDAW); Mojekwo v. Ejikeme, [2000] 5 NWLR 402 (C.A.) (Nigeria) (cus-
tomary law affecting rights of female family members inequitable); Chan v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593 (Can.);
Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988) (CEDAW regarded as relevant even though not ratified by the
Senate); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using CEDAW to support a particular
interpretation of U.S. law—no sense of legal obligation); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, (2003) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring); R. (Khan) v. Oxfordshire County Council, [2002] EWHC 2211 (Admin) (Eng.) (importance of
domestic violence reflected in CEDAW);Mapingure v.Minister of Home Affairs, ZWSC 22 (Zim. Sup. Ct. 2014)
(referring to CEDAW, inter alia: “it is both proper and instructive to have regard to them as embodying norms of
great persuasive value in the interpretation and application of our statutes and the common law.”).
52 See Putusan No. 22-24 PUU-VI/2008 (Const. Ct. Rep. Indon. 2008) (CEDAW’s support for affirmative
action as representing developing international opinion and as a positive development); Rono v. Rono&Another,
supra note 42 (Kenya “wasmoving in tandemwith emerging global culture, particularly on gender issues” in adopt-
ing CEDAW); Fisher v. I.N.S., 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title VII should
be interpreted as having extra-territorial effect on U.S. employers abroad, so that the United States will be
respected). So too, CEDAW is seen as evidence of changing times: Rajapaksha v. Attorney General, supra note 51;
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 49; Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 97Hun-Ka12,
Aug. 31, 2000, (12-2 KCCR 167) (S. Kor.); State v. Bechu, FJMC 3 (Fiji 1999); Amparo en Revisio´n 300/2012,
supra note 49; L v. C, supra note 49; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 13, 2012,
Sentencia C-715-12, at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/RELATORIA/2012/C-715-12.htm (Colom.)
(changing approach to definition of domestic violence);Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet [2003]HCA67 (Austl.)
(CEDAWevidence of changing electoral practices and extension of franchise); Fornah v. Sec’y of State for theHome
Dep’t, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 459 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (“In other words, the world has woken up to the
fact that women as a sex may be persecuted in ways which are different from the ways in which men are persecuted
and that theymay be persecuted because of the inferior status accorded to their gender in their home society”);Hari-
haran v. Reserve Bank of India, supra note 44 (“ . . . the cry for equality and equal status . . . is not restrictive to any
particular country” as is “amply demonstrate[d]” by CEDAW).
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drawsonCEDAWas thebasis for persuading (as opposed to requiring) the legislature to address
a particular social problem identified by the court.53
The temptation is to view these “indirect effect” uses of CEDAW as domestic courts using
CEDAWas the basis formoral and political authority rather than legal authority. But thatwould
be to miss an important dimension of the domestic use we can observe from the cases. It is
important that CEDAW is not just a set of international norms, but that it is a set of interna-
tional legal norms. It is because of the international legal status of CEDAW that it has this per-
suasive (even moral) value; were it not “law,” it would not have this value, not least because
there would be legitimate questions as to why it is that an advocate before the court is drawing
attention to it, or that the court should be paying any attention to it.54 In otherwords, CEDAW
is valuable in the domestic context because it is law, as well as because it is international, even
though CEDAW may not be binding law in the jurisdiction concerned, grounding domestic
subjective legal rights in that jurisdiction.
Dialogic Approaches to Interpreting CEDAW
A relatively strict dichotomy exists between two approaches adopted by the domestic judi-
ciary: either the approach adopted is one where the domestic court regards the interpretation
of CEDAW in that jurisdiction as amatter for the domestic court itself or it adopts a deferential
approach, according considerable weight to the interpretation of CEDAW by other actors,
national and international. What is striking is that a third, more “dialogic” engagement with
foreign domestic courts, is not to be found. A dialogic approach is one in which the domestic
court considers that it shares interpretative space with one or more other bodies, and the
domestic court’s role is to engage in some form of dialogue or conversation with other bodies
in order to arrive at the meaning of CEDAW in the domestic context—for example, engaging
in dialoguewith domestic courts in other jurisdictions about the interpretation of CEDAW, an
approach that ismuch beloved ofmuch recent comparative constitutional law scholarship that
examines judicial interpretation of domestic constitutional rights.
53 See, e.g., Tribunal Constitucional del Peru´ [TC] [Constitutional Court of Peru] Nov. 9, 2007, Gaceta Con-
stitucional, tomo II, febrero de 2008, pa´gina 89 (Peru) (CEDAWmentioned as one of several relevant international
instruments, but used more as a basis for criticising the legislature than as justification for finding for the plaintiff);
Sapana Pradhan v. PrimeMinister,WritNo. 064-WS-0011 of 2065 (S. Ct.Nepal 2008) (rather than declaring the
provision ultra vires, the Court took a pragmatic approach and issued a directive order to the Prime Minister and
to theCouncil ofMinisters asking them to see that the provisions are consistentwithCEDAW);Dhungana v.Nepal,
Writ No. 3392 of 2050, 6 N.K.P. 2052 at 462 (S. Ct. Nepal 1993). In Dhungana, the Forum for Women, Law
and Development, citing CEDAW (which had the status of national law in Nepal), asked the Supreme Court of
Nepal to overturn a law that gave preference to males regarding ancestral property inheritance. Instead of striking
down this law directly, theCourt ordered the government to pass legislationwithin one year to rectify the situation.
See also Pant v. Nepal government,Writ No. 917 of 2064, 138 I.L.R. 500 (S. Ct. Nepal 2007) (ordering the estab-
lishment of a government committee to study same-sexmarriage, taking into account experience in other countries,
and an analysis of international human rights instruments).
54 See Austl. Competition and Consumer Comm’n v P.T. Garuda Indonesia (No. 9) [2013] FCA 323,¶ 47 (Austl.)
(treating international law as law was essential in order “to accept its inherent legal nature, its domestic legal con-
sequences, the practicality of it being dealt with as legal material and the qualification of domestic courts to engage
in such an exercise. Thesemattersmark it out as qualitatively different to foreign law.”) There are contrasting exam-
ples, however, where the Court clearly emphasizes the international aspect of norms rather than their international
legal aspect, for example, citing CEDAW and the Bejing Declaration together: Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India,
supra note 44; Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A. K. Chopra (1999) 1 S.C.C. 759 (India); Vishaka v. State
of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 241 (India).
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For Goodman and Jinks, the key issue is the identification of the patterns of “accultura-
tion”55 that enable this to happen. In this context, a key element in the explanation that these
scholars have developed is the role that networks play in influencing these decisions. So, for
example, a decision by a state to ratify a human rights treaty appears to be significantly affected
by whether that state is a member of networks of other states which have ratified this treaty,
even when the network of which these states is a member has little to do with human rights.
They thus stress the idea of “socialization”56 as the method by which states internalize these
norms to the extent that they ratify these covenants.
Recent scholarship has argued that courts and judges at the national level are also increas-
ingly engaging in conversationwith each other, particularly in the context of rights claims, and
that this judicial conversation takes place in part in formal and informal networks and in part
by engaging with each other’s opinions and decisions in the course of their judgments.57 So,
we might expect the U.K. Supreme Court to cite and discuss relevant cases from the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, when discussing an issue of freedom from discrimination.
Wemight expect, more generally, that an equivalent type of transnational judicial dialogue
is taking place in the interpretation of international law by national judges, where national
judges refer to each other’s interpretation of the international standard. If it is indeed the case
that there is a significant dialogue among domestic courts about the interpretation of domestic
constitutions (including sex discrimination provisions), it is puzzling why so little dialogue
about how to interpret CEDAW appears to be occurring. One might have supposed that the
opposite would be the case: if states are parties to the same treaty, they would want to see how
other courts interpret it,58 not least so as to follow the requirement in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties59 to look at subsequent practice. There are, of course, few provisions
regarding whether courts may look to comparative jurisprudence in the interpretation of con-
stitutional provisions.60
55 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,
54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
56 Id. at 630.
57 There is significant support for such a hypothesis. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, ANEWWORLDORDER, supra note
32, at 65–103; Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 32; Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, supra note 32;
Slaughter, Typology, supra note 32. For examples of such a practice in particular areas, see Guy S. Goodwin-Gill,
The Search for the One, True Meaning . . . , in THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW: REFUGEE LAW, POLICY
HARMONIZATION AND JUDICIAL DIALOGUE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 204, 218 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill &
He´le`ne Lambert eds., 2010) (refugees); Benvenisti, supra note 9, at 252 (phenomenon discernible in three areas:
the judicial review of global counterterrorismmeasures, the protection of the environment in developing countries,
and the status of asylum seekers in destination countries); see also August Reinisch, The International Relations of
National Courts: A Discourse on International Law Norms on Jurisdictional and Enforcement Immunity, in THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONALRELATIONS: LIBER AMICORUMHANSPETERNEUHOLD 289, 293–97 (August Reinisch&
Ursula Kriebaum eds., 2007).
58 See, e.g., Rosanne van Alebeek & Andre´ Nollkaemper, The Netherlands, in THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNI-
TIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 179, 205 (August Reinisch ed., 2013).
59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–33, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155UNTS 331.
60 But see S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39 (stating that courts “may consider foreign law” when interpreting the Bill
of Rights).
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There appears to be evidence in practice to support this assumption,61 and some judges
claim that this is what is occurring.62 So do several scholars. Linos has suggested that “inter-
national and domestic courts are typically faced with ambiguous treaty terms. To interpret
them, they often turn to the jurisprudence of diverse foreign states.”63 Benvenisti has argued
that “national courts often realize that they need to consider approaches adopted by other
courts, foreign national courts or international courts. Unless there are significant reasons to
deviate from the interpretation of international law by one national court, other courts are
likely to follow it.”64 And the assumption that such a development can be harnessed lies behind
a key strategy of those in the UN system supporting the domestic implementation of
CEDAW,65 but the trend goes well beyond Anglophone common law jurisdictions.66
None of these suggestions gains significant support from the study of the application of
CEDAW in national courts. Benvenisti has suggested that “the logic of inter-judicial co-oper-
ation [in the interpretation of international law by domestic courts] has its limits,” noting that
it is not possible to trace such cooperation in the sphere of labor law, for example.67 It would
appear that the interpretation of CEDAW is another example of the absence of such cooper-
ation. Although there is some evidence of a (vertical) dialogue in the interpretation of CEDAW
between states parties and the CEDAW Committee68 (though even this has been challenged69),
there is practically no evidence of a (horizontal) dialogic interpretative approach to CEDAW
in which courts engage with each other transnationally in a cooperative interpretative enter-
prise.70 This is a puzzle.
61 Examples outside theCEDAWcontext include, for example,Canadian cases citing foreign case law in decisions
involving international law issues. See Michel Bastarache, The Globalisation of the Law and the Work of the Supreme
Court of Canada, inHIGHESTCOURTS ANDGLOBALISATION41, 49 (SamMuller&SidneyRichards eds., 2010).
62 See, e.g., Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, Judicial Globalisation: Supreme Court of India, in HIGHEST COURTS AND
GLOBALISATION, supra note 61, at 67, 84 (“[T]he Indian SupremeCourt has begun to see itself as an international
court that is actively engaged in an international dialogue. It is not only looking out towards the international sphere
for sources of obligations, but also access to other national jurisdictions for inspiration and guidance on themeaning
and application of international norms.”).
63 Linos, supra note 38.
64 Eyal Benvenisti & Olga Frishman, Comparative Reasoning and the Democratization of International Law, in
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1. An earlier article provides extensive examples in support of
this proposition, as well as hypotheses why such cooperation takes place. See Eyal Benvenisti &GeorgeW.Downs,
Going Global to Preserve Domestic Accountability: The New Role of National Courts, inHIGHESTCOURTSANDGLO-
BALISATION, supra note 61, at 163. See also JEREMYWALDRON, “PARTLY LAWSCOMMONTOALLMANKIND”:
FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS (2012).
65 See, e.g., BRINGINGEQUALITYHOME, IMPLEMENTINGTHECONVENTIONONTHEELIMINATIONOFALL
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 18 (Ilana Landsberg-Lewis ed., 1998).
66 Guy Canivet, Trans-judicial Dialogue in a Global World, in HIGHEST COURTS ANDGLOBALISATION, supra
note 61, at 21.
67 Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 64, at 181.
68 Judith Resnik, Comparative (In)equalities: CEDAW, the Jurisdiction of Gender, and the Heterogeneity of Trans-
national Law Production, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 531, 544 (2012).
69 YvonneDonders&Vincent Vleugel,Universality, Diversity and Legal Certainty: Cultural Diversity in the Dia-
logue between CEDAW and States Parties 36 (Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2014-40)
(“In the practice of CEDAW, limited constructive interaction with the states parties takes place. Other than (some-
times) ‘noting’ or ‘welcoming’ some efforts by the state party, theCommittee and the state party do not fully engage
in a two-way dialogue”).
70 But see Jacomb v Austl. Mun. Admin. Clerical & Services Union [2004] FCA 1250 (Austl.); Prakash v. Narayan
[2000] FJHC 144 (Fiji) (High Court of Fiji referred to Indian and Australian court decisions in support of its use
of international human rights instruments, including CEDAW); Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, supra note 54
(Supreme Court of India similarly referred to an Australian court decision for the same reason).
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What Domestic Functions Does CEDAW Fulfill in Domestic Courts?
If what has been suggested so far is correct, that domestic jurisdictions sometimes need an
international human rights law source to help address domestic issues, then explanations of
some of the more puzzling patterns of resort to, and approaches to the interpretation of,
CEDAW, and (as importantly) the absence of resort to CEDAW, may be forthcoming. Norms
with an international source may be useful in some contexts and not in others. Whether the
source of the norm being international is appealing to a domestic audience depends signifi-
cantly on the local context. Different national histories suggest different functions for inter-
national human rights law, sometimes leading to different patterns of use and interpretation.
In Zimbabwe, even judges who were sympathetic to the use of international instruments
tendednot to citeCEDAWbecause to do sowould be seen as threatening to a regime concerned
to preserve national sovereignty. Interpretation of the local constitution and legislation is seen
as a preferableway of addressingwomen’s rights; the “principles in these [international] instru-
ments are employedwithout direct acknowledgement.”71 In theNetherlands, CEDAW’s com-
paratively low rate of citation contrasts markedly with citation to other international human
rights instruments, in particular the European Convention onHuman Rights, which suggests
that there is a rough hierarchy of international norms, with CEDAW relatively low down on
the list, meaning that where issues can be addressed using other instruments, referring to
CEDAW will be seen as unnecessary.72 So, too, the pattern of use of CEDAW in the United
Kingdom may be best explained by the absence of other equivalent norms in the refugee area
(because of the relatively weak application of the European Convention on Human Rights
[ECHR] in this area).
In the Australian context, CEDAW plays a critical role in determining the constitutionality
of federal sex discrimination legislation. The federal government’s power to enact such legis-
lation is based on it implementing international instruments ratified by Australia under the
external affairs power. The scope of CEDAW thus determines the legitimate scope of domestic
legislation, and therefore the interpretation of CEDAW becomes a critical issue for internal
domestic legal reasons.73
CEDAW as a Human Rights Convention
Finally, when CEDAW is cited, it is often seen as not just a set of international legal norms
but as a set of international human rights law norms. Courts are presented with CEDAW in this
waybecause of the normativeweight that presenting a claim towomen’s rights as ahuman rights
71 Choice Damiso & Julie Stewart, Zimbabwe and CEDAW Compliance: Pursuing Women’s Equality in Fits and
Starts, in WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 469.
72 Marjolein van den Brink, The CEDAW After All These Years: Firmly Rooted in Dutch Clay?, in WOMEN’S
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 495, 501.
73 AB v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (2007) 162 FCR 528 (Austl.);Aldridge v Booth [1988] FCA 170
(Austl.); Hall v A. & A. Sheiban Pty. Ltd. [1989] FCA 72 (Austl.); see also Andrew Byrnes, The Implementation of
the CEDAW in Australia: Success, Trials, Tribulations and Continuing Struggle, inWOMEN’SHUMANRIGHTS, supra
note 3, at 323.
2015] 547WHY DO NATIONAL COURT JUDGES REFER TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES?
This content downloaded from 163.1.255.60 on Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:09:37 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
claim is presumed to have with the court, and courts may eventually be persuaded by this
move.74
So too, judges appear to use the metaprinciple of “human dignity” as an articulated foun-
dation for CEDAW because this enables the court to link the women’s rights incorporated in
CEDAW with other human rights instruments.
Human rights appear to have a normative weight that other international norms may not
have because of their foundation in metaprinciples such as dignity. This understanding of
human rights appears to be important to the interpretation of CEDAW at the domestic level
not least because of the perception that human rights can present a fundamental challenge to
a status quo that does not recognize adequately this understanding of the human person.
CEDAW is thus referenced as evidence of changing times, and CEDAW is called on to add
weight to a progressive interpretation of domestic legal rights.75 We can see this particularly,
for example, in the judgments of BaronessHale in theUnitedKingdom,whereCEDAW is pre-
sented as of importance because of the changed mind-set towards the position of women that
it embodies.76 In the Indian context, the greater use of CEDAW in the employment context
to challengediscrimination againstwomenhas been seen as part of the IndianSupremeCourt’s
concern with globalization, in which “the employment of women [is] considered a necessary
facet of national growth.”77
There is little evidence that CEDAW has suffered from being tarred by domestic judges as
themere expression of Western liberal values that are of little relevance to countries elsewhere.
On occasion, indeed, courts resist arguments that CEDAW should be adapted to local mores
and norms, rather than the other way round.78 On several occasions, judges have explicitly
linked CEDAW with Islamic texts, in order to support both.79 So, too, the relative popularity
of CEDAW in the East Asian and Pacific regions may be explainable in part by the absence of
any regional source of equivalent norms, compared to the relative non-use of CEDAW in the
area covered by theECHR. In these and other contexts, an explanation drawing from the func-
tions that CEDAW plays in the domestic context appears to “fit” better than others.
74 In an Osaka High Court judgment (Osaka Saiko Saibansho, Sept. 26, 1991, no. 1884, 602 RODO HANREI
72) the plaintiff referred to the Convention in these terms, but the Court did not address the issue. However, in
a more recent case (Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 29, 2013, 2196 HANREI JIHO 67; appealed to
TokyoHighCourt,Mar. 28, 2014 (not yet reported)), theCourts did considerwhether a practice based on theCivil
Code violated CEDAW. Although they denied the existence of the violation of the CEDAW, it would seem probable
that the Court considered that CEDAW could no longer be ignored because of its status as a human rights norm.
I am grateful to Akiko Ejima for this reference.
75 Rajapaksha v. Attorney General, supra note 51; Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, supra note
49; Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 97Hun-Ka12, supra note 52; State v. Bechu, supra note 52; Amparo en
Revisio´n 300/2012, supra note 49; Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, supra note 44; L v. C [2007], supra note
49; Yemshaw v. Hounslow London Borough Council, [2011] UKSC 3, [2011] 1W.L.R. 433 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.) (changing approach to definition of domestic violence);Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet, supra note
52.
76 Fornah v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 459 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (“In
other words, the world has woken up to the fact that women as a sex may be persecuted in ways which are different
from the ways in whichmen are persecuted and that they may be persecuted because of the inferior status accorded
to their gender in their home society.”).
77 Madhu Mehra, India’s CEDAW Story, in WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 385, 408.
78 E.g., Pengadilan Tinggi Jakarta [PTJ] [JakartaHighCourt], PutusanNo. 651/PDT/1988/PT.DKI (Indon.).
79 E.g., Mehmood v. State (1999) PLD (Lahore) 494 (Pak.).
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III. IS CEDAWDIFFERENT?
To what extent is the analysis of this article generalizable beyond CEDAW? There is some
evidence that CEDAWhas features thatmean that its implementation at the domestic level dif-
fers from other human rights treaties.80 We cannot, in other words, assume that what holds
true for CEDAW will hold true for domestic judicial approaches to other human rights con-
ventions, let alone other international lawbeyondhuman rights.DanielHill has suggested that
there is a need for “treaty-specific theory building,”81 and this caution in assuming that what
is true for one human rights treaty will be true for all is a salutary warning.Without equivalent
studies of the domestic judicial approach to other areas of international law, we enter into the
realm of speculation as to whether similar patterns would be likely to be foundmore generally.
I cannot draw any definitive conclusions in the absence of comparative empirical evidence, and
it is one of the purposes of this article to stimulate the production of just such evidence.
My intuition, nevertheless, is that the trends we observe regarding CEDAW are, in general,
likely to apply to other human rights treaties. I do not consider CEDAW to be so anomalous
in the human rights context as to render the findings of this Article sui generis. Nevertheless,
some features of other human rights regimes may mean that they will be differently regarded
by domestic judges, if only in part. Future researchmaywant to focus on (1) differences in how
broad or narrow the subject matter of the treaty is, (2) how general or specific particular pro-
visions are in terms of how much flexibility they leave for interpretation, and (3) how recent
the treaty is, with older treaties perhaps needing to be adapted over timemore thanmore recent
treaties.
Apart from these, two potential differences are already apparent that might be investigated
further in other contexts. First, one of the significant differences in practice between CEDAW
and, for example, international refugee law is that thework of theOffice of theUNHighCom-
missioner forRefugees82 (andpreviously that of JamesHathaway at theUniversity ofMichigan
Law School83) in establishing andmaintaining an authoritative database of domestic level ref-
ugee law judgments has made cross-citation of domestic cases using international refugee law
80 Neil A. Englehart &Melissa K. Miller, The CEDAW Effect: International Law’s Impact on Women’s Rights, 13
J. HUM. RTS. 22, 38 (2014) (CEDAW “appears to be something of an anomaly in the international human rights
treaty regime.”); id. at 23 (emphasizing the greater ambition of CEDAW, even when compared with other human
rights treaties).
81 Daniel W. Hill Jr., Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161, 1172
(2010).
82 REFWORLD, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,,CASELAW,,,0.html (last visited July 23,
2015) (this site, containing over 7,000 judicial decisions from a large number of jurisdictions, is maintained by the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).
83 James Hathaway, About RefLaw, REFLAW, http://www.reflaw.org/reflaw (last visited July 23, 2015) (“The
University of Michigan, in cooperation with the International Association of Refugee Law Judges, launched refu-
geecaselaw.org in 1999 to ‘fill the void’ at a time when the UNHCR did not operate a full caselaw database. Even
after UNHCR’s Refworld collection ultimately came to include refugee caselaw, its search interface was generally
found to be inadequate to the needs of judges, lawyers, scholars and others who wished to be able to perform struc-
tured and targeted searches for cases of a specific type. In the result, refugeecaselaw.org was maintained alongside
Refworld to facilitate such research. FollowingUNHCR’s fundamental retooling of its caselaw collection, it became
evident that there was no longer a need for refugeecaselaw.org to continue operating in its previous capacity.”).
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much easier for domestic courts in that context than is the case with CEDAW, and unsurpris-
ingly we find more use of foreign domestic cases in that context.84 Second, one might predict
that one reason to expect there would be many cases citing the UNConvention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),85 even though the Convention only came into force in
2008, is that there are very active transnational NGOs whose aim is to use CRPD in domestic
litigation.86
IV. CONCLUSION
The investigation of the different functions of international human rights law at the domes-
tic level defines the core of the study of “comparative international human rights law.” The
observable patterns of references to CEDAW in national-level courts could result, to a signif-
icant degree, from the combination of the four elements involved in comparative international
human rights law: that it is international law; and that it concerns human rights; and that it
is law; and that it is being applied domestically.
The first three elements combined offer domestic courts a set of norms that is consensus-
based (“international”) and purportedly universal (“human rights”), which courts and legal
advocates are able to draw on (“law”), in order to help address domestic concerns, or escape
from otherwise troublesome “domestic” constraints. Courts and advocates in different juris-
dictions draw on such norms in order to address similar or different domestic constraints, and
similarities or differences may therefore emerge between these different jurisdictions as to the
meaning and scope of the human right in question as a result.The similar or different functions
played indifferent jurisdictions by this set of four elements contribute to an explanationof sim-
ilarities or differences in substantive interpretation at the national level that neither previous
international law literature taken by itself, nor the scholarship of comparative human rights
taken by itself, delivers.
I hope that these tentative explanationswill be subject to rigorous testing in the future in this
and other contexts. They will need to be tested against similar analysis of national level judg-
ments of other international human rights treaties and customary international human rights
law, before any broader conclusion about the role of international human rights in general can
be drawn. There is some evidence that the implementation of CEDAWat the national level has
particular attributes that may mean that the findings are not necessarily transferable to other
international human rights contexts, let alone the judicial interpretation of international law
beyond human rights. Nevertheless, the study highlights a role for domestic judicial use of
international human rights standards that differs from orthodox interpretations, demonstrat-
ing the utility of a comparative international human rights analysis.
84 WilliamDuncan, Judicial Co-operation and Communication in the Context of the Hague Conventions, inHIGH-
ESTCOURTS ANDGLOBALISATION (SamMuller&SidneyRichards eds., 2010) 59, 65 (noting how the free avail-
ability on the Internet of decisions by courts in jurisdictions party to the Hague Convention of 1980 on Child
Abduction has facilitated transnational judicial dialogue).
85 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Mar. 30, 2007, 2515 UNTS 3.
86 It is hoped that the results of a forthcoming study of the implementation of CRPD by Lisa Waddington and
Anna Lawson may throw some greater light on this, and the other issues highlighted.
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